A Public Firm's R&D Policy and Trade Liberalization by Tomaru, Yoshihiro
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Public Firm’s R&D Policy and Trade
Liberalization
Yoshihiro Tomaru
August 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28173/
MPRA Paper No. 28173, posted 18. January 2011 20:12 UTC
A Public Firm’s R&D Policy and Trade Liberalization†
Yoshihiro Tomaru‡
Faculty of Economics, Toyo University, Japan
Abstract
This paper studies a public firm’s incentive to raise its productive efficiency by undertak-
ing cost-reducing R&D investment when it competes against a foreign private firm. Our focus
is to ravel out how a decrease in an importing tariff levied on foreign goods affects this invest-
ment level inter alia. We show that when the government imposes non-negative tariffs, a tariff
reduction lowers the R&D investment, irrespective of whether the public firm has downward
or upward sloping reaction curve. Namely, R&D investment conducted by the public firm is
substitutable to an importing tariff. Furthermore, under a linear demand assumption, it is con-
cluded that a tariff reduction necessarily enhances world welfare if both R&D investment and
tariffs are set to domestic welfare-maximizing levels. More strict assumptions on marginal
cost and R&D cost function make complete trade liberalization desirable from the viewpoint
of world welfare.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between a public firm’s R&D policy and an importing tar-
iff. In particular, we clarify how a tariff reduction influences the cost-reducing R&D investment
which the public firm determines to maximize its objective. More precisely, this paper endeav-
ors to reveal whether the current worldwide movement toward trade liberalization enhances the
productive efficiency of public enterprises. Fruthermore, this paper also discusses an influence of
such trade liberalization movement on world welfare.
The productive inefficiency of public enterprises has been one of controversial issues. Em-
pirical studies reveal equivocal results (see Stiglitz 1988, and Bo¨s 1991), but many recent works
substantiate that private firms produce at lower costs (see Megginson and Netter 2001, and many
papers cited by them). At the same time, there are some theoretical studies investigating whether
public enterprises could produce less efficiently than private rivals in the associated markets.
Nishimori and Ogawa (2002) compare the levels of cost-reducing R&D investment conducted by
a public firm in public monopoly and mixed oligopoly with both public and private firms.1 From
this comparison, they show that the level of R&D investment is lower in mixed oligopoly. Tomaru
(2007) shows that this result hold even though the public firm competes against foreign private
firms. Moreover, Matsumura and Matsushima (2004), using a Hotelling model with public and
private firms’ choices on price, location and R&D investment, prove that the marginal cost of the
public firm is higher than that of the private firm in equilibrium.2
All these theoretical works indicate public firms’ disincentives to reduce its production costs.
Given these disincentives, this paper goes further over these works. The shortcoming of them
1Assuming that public enterprises are welfare-maximizers and compete against private firms, De Fraja and Del-
bono (1989), a harbinger in mixed oligopoly theory, show that privatization of the public firms leads to an improve-
ment if the relevant market is competitive. Following their research, recently, many studies on mixed oligopoly
have been proliferated. For recent studies, see Ishida and Matsushima (2009), Long and Sta¨hler (2009), Kamijo and
Nakamura (2009), and Ino and Matsumura (2010).
2The mixed oligopoly literature contains many studies on cost-reducing R&D. Cato (2008a) proves Nishimori and
Ogawa’s (2002) result in a more general model, Cato (2008b) takes spillover into account, Poyago-Theotoky (1998)
investigates the role of a public firm in the free-rider problem when imitation is easy, Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006)
consider a patent race model where each firm chooses not only R&D expenditure but also its innovation size, and etc.
1
lies in an ignorance of correlations between public firm’s R&D policy and other governmental
intervention. The exception is Poyago-Theotoky, Gil-Molto, and Zikos (2010). They investigate
incentives of both public and private firms to undertake R&D investment when these firms receive
subsidies per unit of R&D outputs. Namely, their focus is on the relationship between domestic
industrial policy and firms’ R&D. The focus of this paper differs from their research, and it is on
that between trade policy and public firm’s R&D. In particular, we concentrate on the effect of
trade liberalization on this R&D activity, or on public firm’s productive efficiency.
As frequently observed in many countries or regions such as EU and ASEAN countries, trade
liberalization usually goes with capital liberalization and deregulation. This influences market
outcomes in various industries, even in mixed oligopolistic industries. For instance, the Swedish
market have been liberalized and linked up with other countries such as Finland and Norway.
As a result of liberalization and internationalization, Vattenfall, which is wholly owned by the
Swedish government, is now facing fierce competition with various foreign firms such as EDF
IVO, and Statkraft. As for such competition through trade liberalization and deregulation, it
might be widely thought a tariff reduction or trade liberalization contributes to an improvement
in public firm’s productivity, since it accelerates competition between public and foreign firms. Is
this really true? This paper is devoted to answer this question.
Then, we start with an international mixed duopoly model with one inefficient public firm
undertaking the cost-reducing R&D investment and one efficient foreign private firm not under-
taking such investment. In this model, the domestic government levies an importing tariff on
foreign goods. Using this setting, we show that a tariff reduction leads to an increase in public
firm’s investment. In other words, trade liberalization enhances the productive efficiency of public
firm. The intuition behind this result is intelligible. A tariff reduction leads to the terms of trade
for the domestic country and a decrease in the exploited rents from the private firm. To make
up for these welfare losses, the public firm attempts to offset a deterioration in the terms of trade
by expanding its output through R&D investment. More surprisingly, a rise in R&D investment
level via a tariff reduction does not depend on whether the public firm has upward or downward
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sloping reaction curve under the output-setting stage.
Furthermore, we explore the optimal tariff determined by the domestic government. We ob-
tain three new results. First, the domestic government has an incentive to impose a positive tariff.
This does not depend on the level of R&D investment. Second, if both R&D and trade policies
are utilized, the public firm always produces more than the private firm. Seemingly, the relation-
ship should be reversed, since production cost can be saved by replacing public firm’s production
with private firm’s one through keeping both an importing tariff rate and R&D investment level
lower. However, our result indicates that it is not the case. The government adjusts both policy
instruments to bolster the aggressive public firm’s behavior. Finally, with linear demand, a tariff
reduction under the optimization with respect to both policies enhances the world welfare. Fur-
thermore, with more strong restriction (i.e.,linear demand, linearly decreasing marginal cost, and
quadratic R&D cost), the whole world can enjoy higher benefits from complete trade liberaliza-
tion, that is, no tariffs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model and
elaborates on an influence of a tariff reduction on public firm’s R&D investment level. In section
3, we discuss the optimal tariff and both public and private firms’ behaviors under this tariff.
On the basis of the results from sections 2 and 3, section 4 is devoted to reveal whether trade
liberalization contributes to an improvement in world welfare. Finally, section 5 concludes this
paper.
2 The model
Consider one country wherein one public firm is established and competes against one foreign
private firm. The demand in this country is given by P = P(Q), where P is the price, Q = q0 + q1
is total outputs, q0 is the output of the public firm, and q1 is the output of the foreign private
firm. As usual in the existing works on mixed oligopoly such as De Fraja and Delbono (1989),
we assume that the public firm maximizes domestic welfare, whereas the foreign private firm
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maximizes its profits.
Each firm is assumed to have a constant marginal cost technology. As stated in the introduc-
tion, our main purpose is to investigate public firm’s inefficiency and influences of tariff reduction
on this inefficiency. To this end, in this paper, the public firm is assumed to conduct cost reducing
R&D, and its marginal cost is represented as C(x0) where x0 is the level of R&D investment. In
addition, the public firm incurs investment costs f (x0). On the other hand, we do not assume that
the foreign private firm undertakes cost-reducing R&D.3 Then, we denote the marginal cost of the
foreign private firm by c.
The profits of public and private firms are given by
Π0(q0, q1, x0) := [P(Q) −C(x0)] q0 − f (x0),
Π1(q0, q1, t) := [P(Q) − c − t] q1,
respectively. t is a tariff rate levied by the domestic government. The domestic welfare is given
by
W(q0, q1, x0, t) :=
∫ Q
0
P(z)dz − P(Q)q1 −C(x0)q0 − f (x0) + tq1.
For our subsequent analysis, we assume that:
Assumption 1. P(Q) is twice continuously differentiable with P′(Q) < 0 for all Q ≥ 0 such that
3The reason for this assumption is germane to private firm’s activeness in the market. As seen in the succeeding
analysis, the welfare-maximizing public firm acts more aggressively than private firms, regardless of rival firms’
nationality. Such a public firm’s aggressive behavior would repel private firms from the market unless private firms
are more efficient than the public firm. Especially, when t = 0 and firms have constant marginal costs, cost-superiority
or parity of the public firm to private firms makes private firms inactive. For detailed discussion, see Matsumura and
Kanda (2005) and Tomaru and Kiyono (2010). In addition, under the assumption, our model can be interpreted as
an analysis on the world economy where the foreign firm technologically mature whereas the domestic public firm
endeavors to catch up. For this justification, see Konishi (1999).
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P(Q) > 0. Furthermore, it satisfies
ε(Q) ∈ (−1, 1) and ε′(Q) = 0, where ε(Q) := QP
′′(Q)
P′(Q) .
Assumption 2. C(x0) is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies C(x0) > 0, C′(x0) < 0, and
C′′(x0) > 0 for all x0 ≥ 0.
Assumption 3. f (x0) is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies f (x0) ≥ 0 for all x0 ≥ 0
with f (x0) = 0 if and only if x0 = 0. Furthermore, it satisfies f ′(x0) > 0 and f ′′(x0) ≥ 0 for all
x0 > 0.
For tractability, we assume that c = 0.4 Coupled with this assumption and Assumption 2,
the public firm cannot produce at the lower cost than the private firm, even though it engages
in R&D to reduce its marginal cost. Consequently, the private firm always has an incentive to
serve the good to the domestic market, unless t is prohibitive. Assumption 3 indicates that R&D
investment is subject to non-increasing return to scale.5 On the contrary to Assumptions 2 and 3, it
might seem that Assumption 1 is somewhat strong assumption. As described in the introduction,
the aim of this paper is to investigate how the optimal R&D investment level of the public firm
is affected by a tariff reduction, and on the basis of this investigation, to unlock whether trade
liberalization improves world welfare. This exploration involves the intricate multi-stage game
and moreover, calls for a close examination and perplexing calculation. Inevitably, therefore, the
results are recondite and equivocal in highly general models. To avoid such ambiguity of results
and to obtain the definite policy implications as well, we impose Assumption 1.6
4If limx0→∞C0(x0) > c is added into Assumption 2, a lack of assumption c = 0 leaves the results, which will be
obtained subsequently, intact.
5As observed later, Assumption 3 plays an important role in ensuring the second-order condition in the R&D
setting stage. d’Asprement and Jacquemin (1988), Poyago-Theotoky (1996), Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000),
among others assume the strong convexity of f to ensure the second-order conditions of R&D-conducting firms. On
the other hand, Suzumura (1992), Neary and Ulph (1997), Konishi (1999), among others assume that f is constant,
but take function C satisfying those conditions. Our assumptions include both of them.
6Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1993) shall vindicate this assumption. Similar to our analysis, they utilize it to
accomplish an ambitious objective; an investigation of whether the number of private firms engaging in both R&D
and quantity competition is excessive from the viewpoint of social welfare.
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We consider the following two-stage game. In the first stage, the domestic public firm deter-
mines its cost-reducing R&D investment level x0. Observing this investment level, both domestic
public and foreign private firms simultaneously select their outputs qi (i = 0, 1) in the second
stage. As usual, we apply backward induction in solving this game.
Now let us proceed to an analysis on the second stage. The foreign firm selects its output
to maximize its profits, whereas the public firm selects its output to maximize domestic welfare,
which results in the following first-order conditions:
∂W
∂q0
= P(Q) − P′(Q)q1 −C(x0) = 0, (1)
∂Π1
∂q1
= P(Q) + P′(Q)q1 − t = 0.
As observed straightforwardly, the second-order conditions are satisfied under Assumption 1. It
is well-known, in the mixed oligopoly literature, that a public enterprise competing against only
domestic private firms sets its output such that the price is equal to its marginal cost. However, the
first-order condition Eq.(1) states that its marginal cost exceed the price if the public firm faces
competition with only foreign private firm.7 Namely, competition with foreign firms makes the
domestic public firm more aggressive. This is attributable to an improvement in the terms of trade
though the domestic public firms’ aggressive behaviors.
From the first-order conditions, the reaction function of each firms is derived; R0(q1, x0) and
R1(q0, t). Under Assumption 1, the private firm’s reaction curve is downward sloping and its slope
is less than unity in absolute value. Thus, its strategy is strategic substitute. On the other hand,
unfortunately, this assumption does not warrant the strategic substitutability in the case of the
7The mixed oligopoly literature includes a wide variety of studies on foreign competition. Fjell and Pal (1996)
show that a public firm increases its output as the number of foreign private firms becomes large. Pal and White
(1998) investigate a relationship between privatization and strategic trade policy. For other works, see Matsushima
and Matsumura (2006), Mukherjee and Suetrong (2009), and Matsumura, Matsushima and Ishibashi (2009).
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public firm. Indeed,
∂R0
∂q1
=
P′′(Q)q1
P′(Q) − P′′(Q)q1 =
εθ
1 − εθ , where θ :=
q1
Q .
This implies that the public firm’s strategy is substitute (resp. complement) if and only ε < 0
(resp. > 0). Nonetheless, |∂R0/∂q1| falls down in (0, 1). Hence, irrespective of whether its strategy
is substitute or complement, the second-stage equilibrium is unique and stable if this equilibrium
exists. Then, we assume that interior solutions always exist in the second stage as long as t and/or
x0 are not extremely large. Additionally, we preclude such t and x0 from the target from our
investigation. Henceforth, we, without any notice, refer to all x0 and/or all t as all x0 and t except
for those which deter the interior solution.
Let us denote q∗i (x0, t) be the second-stage Cournot Nash equilibrium (i = 0, 1). For succeed-
ing analysis, we ascertain how these Cournot equilibrium outputs are affected by x0. Straightfor-
ward computation asserts the following:
Lemma 1. Define Q∗(x0, t) := q∗0(x0, t) + q∗1(x0, t) and θ∗(x0, t) := q∗1(x0, t)/Q∗(x0, t). For each x0
and t,
∂q∗0
∂x0
=
[2 + εθ∗(x0, t)] C′(x0)
2P′(Q∗(x0, t)) > 0,
∂q∗1
∂x0
= −[1 + εθ
∗(x0, t)] C′(x0)
2P′(Q∗(x0, t)) < 0,
∂q∗0
∂t
=
εθ∗(x0, t)
2P′(Q∗(x0, t)) ,
∂q∗1
∂t
=
1 − εθ∗(x0, t)
2P′(Q∗(x0, t)) < 0.
Proof : See Appendix.
An increase in x0 discourages the private firm’s production and expedites the public firm’s
production. On the other hand, a rise in t contracts the output of the private firm, while the effect
of tariffs on that of the public firm depends on the sign of ε, in other words, on the public firm’s
best response to the private firm’s strategy. When the public firm’s strategy is substitute (resp.
complement), a rise in t decreases (resp. increases) q∗0. The behaviors of θ∗(x0, t) in response to
x0 and t are also double-edged. All we can say is that an increase in x0 always lowers θ∗ if ε ≥ 0,
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whereas a rise in t always decreases θ∗ if ε ≤ 0.
Now we go on to the first stage. The payoff function which the government confronts in this
stage is given by
W∗(x0, t) := W(q∗0(x0, t), q∗1(x0, t), x0, t).
We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied. The optimal R&D investment level x∗0(t)
satisfies
0 =
∂W∗(x∗0(t), t)
∂x0
=
∂W
∂q0
· ∂q
∗
0
∂x0
+
∂W
∂x0
,
=
[
t − P′(Q∗(x∗0(t), t))q∗1(x∗0(t), t)
] · ∂q∗1
∂x0
− [C′(x∗0(t))q∗0(x∗0(t), t) + f ′(x∗0(t))] . (2)
The effect of an increase in x0 on domestic welfare is decomposed into the following two. One is
strategic effect which is the first term in the right-hand side. This effect emanates from a change
in q1 via strategic substitution. Especially, this is definitely negative when t ≥ 0. The other is
cost-reducing effect which refers to the second term. This is a direct effect of investment. It is
ramified into two effects; a decrease in marginal cost of the public firm and an increase in R&D
cost. The sign of this effect is double-edged. The public firm attempts to balance the strategic
effect and the cost-reducing effect in choosing x0.
Here, as a clue to understand what level of investment the public firm selects, we compare
x∗0(t) with the cost-minimization levels of investment. For this purpose, we take up two types
of cost-minimizing R&D investment level. One is that in public monopoly. Let xm0 denote this
investment level. The other is that in international mixed duopoly which is denoted by xd0(t). From
Assumptions 2 and 3, xm0 evidently meets C′(xm0 )qm0 + f ′(xm0 ) = 0 where qm is a welfare-maximizing
output in public monopoly. As for xd0(t), assuming that ∂2F(x0, t)/∂x20 > 0 for all x0 ≥ 0, where
F(x0, t) := C(x0)q∗0(x0, t) + f (x0), we find that ∂F(xd0(t), t)/∂x0 = 0 holds. Comparisons among
x∗(t), xm and xd0(t) derive the following result.
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Lemma 2. For all t ≥ 0, (i) xd0(t) < x∗0(t) and (ii) x∗0(t) < xm0 if either ε ≤ 0 or
qm0 − q∗0(xm0 , t)
q∗1(xm0 , t)
− 1 + εθ
∗(xm0 , t)
2
< 0. (3)
Proof : See Appendix.
Lemma 2 states that xd0(t) < x∗0(t) < xm0 if the public firm has an downward sloping reaction
curve, or if the line, which goes through both public monopoly and international mixed duopoly
equilibria in (q0, q1) space, is not steep. In other words, when the public firm’s reaction to private
firm’s strategy is not strong complement, the optimal investment level is excessive compared to
the cost-minimization level in international mixed duopoly, but it falls short of that in public
monopoly.
To expatiate this result, let us start from the situation wherein the public firm chooses xd0(t)
instead of x∗0(t). When the domestic government levies a positive tariff, the strategic effect is neg-
ative whereas the cost-reducing effect is positive. As explained, the aggressive behavior of the
public firm improves the terms of trade and thus enhances domestic welfare. Since this terms-of-
trade improvement effect is strong, the cost-reducing effect dominates the strategic effect. There-
fore, it is concluded that xd0(t) < x∗0(t). Next, we explain the intuition behind Lemma 2 (ii). Under
the assumption of either ε ≥ 0 or Eq.(3), with x0 = x∗0(t) remaining, a move from mixed duopoly
to public monopoly equilibrium leads to an increase or a small decrease in q0. In this regard,
the public firm can enhance domestic welfare by producing more efficiently and by increasing its
output. This is because the public firm is a sole producer and cannot have the private firm incur
production cost by replacing its production with private one. Hence, R&D investment level is
raised to xm0 .
One of our main aims is to explore the relationship between the optimal R&D investment x∗(t)
and t. As for this issue, highly complicated calculation proves the following:
Proposition 1. For each ε ∈ [− 13 , 1) and t ≥ 0, x∗′0 (t) < 0.
Proof : See Appendix.
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Given that the public firm selects x0 to maximize domestic welfare under a certain tariff rate
t ≥ 0, a gradual trade liberalization is prone to boost its R&D investment level. In other words,
Proposition 1 indicates that the current worldwide movement toward trade liberalization enhances
the productive efficiency of the domestic public firm. It also demonstrates that the public firm’s
R&D and an importing tariff are substitutable policies for the domestic government. Some works
on mixed oligopoly have explored the substitutability between domestic and trade policies. Chao
and Yu (2006) show that partial privatization of raises the optimal tariff. Matsumura and Tomaru
(2010) show that the optimal subsidy rate provided to both public and private firms decreases
with a progress in gradual capital liberalization if the relevant market is not so competitive. Most
studies on international mixed oligopoly, including these two studies, assume that the public
firm’s reaction function is either upward sloping or horizontal (or, P′′(Q) ≤ 0). This assumption
corresponds to ε ≥ 0 in our model. Surprisingly, Proposition 1 states that it does not matter
whether the public firm’s response is strategic substitute to, complement to, or independent from
the private firm’s strategy. Namely, the strategic attitude of the public firm is not a clincher of
substitutability between domestic and trade policies.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. A tariff reduction worsens the terms of trade
for the domestic country. Furthermore, this reduction decreases the efficient foreign firm’s rent
which the domestic government can exploit. In order to compensate such a domestic welfare
loss, the public firm attempts to offset a deterioration in the terms of trade by raising the R&D
investment level. Accordingly, we can assert that x∗′(t) < 0. However, this is not true when ε
is negative and |ε| is large. In this case, the public firm has a steeply downward-sloping reaction
curve. A tariff reduction replaces the public firm’s production with the private firm’s. In addition,
when the public firm refrains from its investment, the private firm’s output increases. All these
increases in the private firm’s production saves the domestic production costs. Therefore, if a
welfare improvement due to this cost saving dominate that due to an improvement in the terms of
trade, a tariff reduction decreases it, far from raising R&D investment level.
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The optimal tariff
In the previous section, we have discussed the relationship between R&D conducted by a public
firm and an importing tariff. Although the conclusion of substitutability between them is impor-
tant and suggestive, we should not ignore the fact that the derivation of the conclusion is based
on a non-negative tariff assumption. In this section, we derive the optimal tariff to examine the
plausibility of this assumption. Previously we differentiated W∗ with respect to t. Instead, let us
differentiate W∗ with respect to t, which result in
0 = ∂W
∗
∂t
=
[
t − P′(Q∗)q∗1
] ∂q∗1
∂t
+ q∗1. (4)
As observed straightforwardly, the effects of t on domestic welfare is twofold, as in the case of
optimization for x0. One is strategic effect and the other is tariff revenue effect. This is a direct
effect of a tariff change on tariff revenue. Similar to the effects of x0, strategic effect goes either
way of positive or negative. Of course, it is negative when t ≥ 0. On the other hand, the tariff
revenue effect is definitely positive. The government selects an importing tariff (or an importing
subsidy) so as to offset these two effects. Let us define the optimal tariff, which satisfies Eq.(4),
by t∗(x0). Then, we can establish the following.
Proposition 2. For all ε ∈ (−1, 1) and x0 ≥ 0, t∗(x0) > 0.
Proof : See Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that the domestic government levies a positive tariff on foreign goods.
Instead, suppose that the domestic government does not impose any tariffs. In this case, tariff
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revenue effect dominates strategic effect. In fact,
∂W∗
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
t=0
= −P′(Q∗(x0, t))q∗1(x0, t) ·
∂q∗1
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣∣
t=0
+ q∗1(x0, 0),
=
[1 + εθ∗(x0, 0)] q∗1(x0, 0)
2
,
> 0.
This implies that the government levies a positive tariff in order to garner tariff revenues, expecting
this positive welfare impact to exceed the negative impact through strategic effect. Note that the
tariff revenue itself is increasing in t around t = t∗(x0). Defining T (x0, t) := tq∗1(x0, t), welfare
decomposition Eq.(4) can be rearranged as follows:
0 = ∂W
∗
∂t
= −P′(Q∗)q∗1 ·
∂q∗1
∂t
+
∂T
∂t
.
Since the first term in the right-hand side is negative, the second term is positive. Therefore, a
decrease in t lessens tariff revenue at t = t∗(x0).
To close this section, we consider optimization for both R&D and tariff. Let us denote the
R&D investment and tariff, which satisfy both Eqs.(2) and (4), by xe and te, respectively. Using
these, we can establish the following interesting result:
Proposition 3. Provided that ε ≥ 0, the domestic public firm produces more than the foreign
private firm for xe0 and te.
Proof : See Appendix.
As described in Section 2, for certain x0 and t, the public firm behaves aggressively. Therefore,
the claim in Proposition 3 seems nonsense and feckless. Of course, this is reasonable if both
public and private firms possess the same technology or the public firm has superiority in its
technology. However, given there is a cost differential between them even though the public firm
engages in R&D, we cannot assert that the output of the public firm exceeds that of the private
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firm. Indeed, we can present some examples in which q0 < q1 when only one of policies is applied
out of R&D and tariff. Suppose that P(Q) = a − Q, C(x0) = c0 − x0, and f (x0) = 4x20. In the
case wherein t is controlled, simple calculation reveals that t∗(0) = c0/3, q∗0(0, t∗(0)) = a − c0,
and q∗1(0, t∗(0)) = c0/3. Evidently, q∗1(0, t∗(0)) ≥ q∗0(0, t∗(0)) > 0 if 3a/4 ≤ c0 < a. Besides,
consider that x0 is a sole control variable. Equilibrium outcomes are given by x∗0(0) = (4a −
5c0)/27, q∗0(x∗0(0), 0) = (31a− 32c)/27, and q∗1(x∗0(0), 0) = 2(8c− a)/27. It follows from them that
q∗1(x∗0(0), 0) ≥ q∗0(x∗0(0), 0) if 11a/16 ≤ c0 < 4a/5. These mathematical results demonstrate that
with the government having just one policy at hand, the aggressive public firm would produce
less than the foreign private firm, when the initial technology of the public firm c0 is in the middle
range. However, Proposition 3 shows that the relationship of q0 and q1 depends not on demand
size or initial technology, but on whether the public firm’s reaction curve is upward sloping or
downward sloping.
3 Trade liberalization and world welfare
This section aims to gauge an influence of trade liberalization on world welfare. For this purpose,
we define world welfare WT as the sum of domestic welfare W and foreign private firm’s profits
Π1.
WT (q0, q1, x0) : = W(q0, q1, x0, t) + Π1(q0, q1, t),
=
∫ Q
0
P(z)dz −C(x0)q0 − f (x0).
Our focus in this section is on the effect of trade liberalization on world welfare, given both R&D
investment level and tariff are selected to maximize the domestic welfare. Then, we need WT
which is evaluated at (q∗0(x0, t), q∗1(x0, t)). Then, we redefine the world welfare, which is presented
13
as
W∗T (x0, t) := WT (q∗0(x0, t), q∗1(x0, t), x0). (5)
Before turning to the analysis, it would be useful to ascertain whether the R&D investment
level maximizing world welfare is larger or smaller than x∗(t). Differentiating Eq.(5) with respect
to x0,
0 =
∂W∗T
∂x0
= [P(Q∗) −C(x0)]
∂q∗0
∂x0
+ P(Q∗)∂q
∗
1
∂x0
−C′(x0)q∗0 − f ′(x0),
= q∗1P
′(Q∗)∂q
∗
0
∂x0
+
[
t − P′(Q∗)q∗1
] ∂q∗1
∂x0
−C′(x0)q∗0 − f ′(x0) (6)
(from both firms’ first-order conditions)
Different from domestic welfare maximization, one more effect is added when we probe world
welfare maximization. This is the first term in the right-hand side. Let us designate this effect
as overproduction effect. Although P(Q∗) = C(x0) is desirable from the viewpoint of world
welfare, the domestic public firm overproduces as observed from the first-order condition (1).
This overproduction exacerbates world welfare, and thereby overproduction effect is negative.
Alternatively, this negativity can be explained by the fact that an increase in q0 though a rise in x0
deteriorates the terms of trade for the foreign country and this leads to serious world welfare loss.
Let x∗∗0 (t) be the R&D investment level satisfying Eq.(6). Then, the following result is estab-
lished:
Lemma 3. The domestic public firm undertakes the excessive investment from the viewpoint of
world welfare.
Proof : See Appendix.
R&D investment encourages the public firm to expand its production. This induces it to
overproduce and the private firm to underproduce, from the viewpoint of world welfare. Such
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an inefficient allocation can be removed by lowering R&D investment level. Thus, we have
x∗0(t) > x∗∗0 (t).
We now get into the discussion on trade liberalization. For analysis, define ŴT (t) as follows:
ŴT (t) := W∗T (x∗0(t), t).
We look into a change in world welfare in response to trade liberalization by using this function.
Defining Π∗1(x0, t) := Π1(q∗0(x0, t), q∗1(x0, t), t), the derivative of this function is given by
Ŵ ′T (t) =
(
∂W∗
∂x0
+
∂Π∗1
∂x0
)
x∗′(t) + ∂Π
∗
1
∂t
+
∂W∗
∂t
,
=
∂Π∗1
∂x0
· x∗′0 (t) +
∂Π∗1
∂t
+
∂W∗
∂t
, (from Eq.(2)).
The first term in the right-hand side is positive for all ε ∈ [13 , 1), and the second term is negative.
On the other hand, the sign of the third term is dependent on t, but it is zero for t = te. Conse-
quently, even though Ŵ ′T (t) is measured at t = te, the sign of Ŵ ′T (t) is indetermined, depending on
which effect is predominant, the first or second. With linear demand and an additional condition,
the following definite result can be concluded.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the domestic government sets the R&D investment level and tariff
at xe and te, respectively. Moreover, suppose that ε = 0. Gradual trade liberalization always
enhances the world welfare.
Proof : See Appendix.
To elucidate the intuition behind this proposition, we present some remarks when ε = 0. First,
defining θe(t) = θ∗(x∗0(t), t), it follows that a tariff reduction along the optimal schedule of x0 raises
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the private firm’s market share, i.e., θe′(t) < 0. In fact,
θe′(t) = ∂θ
∗
∂x0
· x∗′0 (t) +
∂θ∗
∂t
,
=
x∗′0 (t)
Q∗(x0(t), t)
(
∂q∗0
∂x0
− θe(t) · ∂Q
∗
∂x0
)
+
∂θ∗
∂t
,
=
(2 − θe(t))C′(x∗0(t))x∗′0 (t)
2P′(Q∗(x0(t), t))Q∗(x0(t), t) +
∂θ∗
∂t
, (from Lemma 1 and ε = 0).
Recall that ∂θ∗/∂t < 0 if ε ≤ 0, as shown below Lemma 1. Therefore, this equation is negative.
Second, a tariff reduction along the optimal schedule of x0 decreases total outputs, i.e., Qe′(t) < 0
where Qe(t) := Q∗(x∗0(t), t). Combined with the first and second remarks, augmenting profits of
the private firm can be concluded. The final remark is that a tariff reduction lowers production
by the public firm. This implies that overproduction is resolved. In sum, these two effects—an
increase in private firms’ profits and removal of overproduction—improves world welfare.
Remark 1. Complete trade liberalization (i.e., t = 0) enhances the world welfare in the following
model (linear demand, linearly decreasing cost, quadratic R&D cost): P(Q) = 1 − Q, C(x0) =
c0 − x0, and f (x0) = 4x20, where 1/8 < c0 < 3/4 which ensures the interior solution.
Simple computation apprise us that in such an environment,
x∗0(t) =
4 − 5c0 − t
27
, q∗0(x∗(t), t) =
31 − 32c0 − t
27
, q∗1(x∗(t), t) =
−2 + 16c0 − 13t
27
,
W∗(x∗0(t), t) =
−20t2 + 2(8c0 − 1)t + 40c20 − 64c0 + 31
54 ,
W∗T (x∗0, t) =
−202t2 + 50(1 − 8c0)t + 1592c20 − 1856c0 + 845
1458 .
As ascertained straightforwardly, world welfare maximization calls for an importing subsidy,
while the domestic government has an incentive to levy a positive tariff. Since both W∗(x∗0(t), t)
and W∗T (x∗0, t) are quadratic functions with respect to t, we can verify that the removal of tariffs
always raises the world welfare.
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4 Concluding remarks
We have explored a public firm’s incentive to conduct cost-reducing R&D investment when it
competes against a private firm and the domestic government levies an importing tariff on the for-
eign goods. In particular, our focus is on how the optimal R&D investment level is affected by an
importing tariff. We showed that a tariff reduction facilitates more R&D investment. Surprisingly,
this result is not dependent on whether the public firm’s reaction curve is upward or downward
sloping in the output-setting stage. In most of studies on international mixed oligopoly, it is as-
sumed that public firms have either horizontal or upward sloping reaction curves, as a sufficient
condition to ensure the second-order conditions for their and private firms’ optimization. On the
contrary to these studies, without such an assumption, we proved the substitutability between an
R&D policy and an importing tariff.
Furthermore, we investigated the domestic government’s optimization of tariffs. This inves-
tigation revealed that it always has an incentive to impose a positive tariff. In addition, when
both R&D policy and tariff are controlled so as to maximize the domestic welfare, the public
firm produces more than the private firm. This result is surprising, since the cost-reducing R&D
investment does not allow the public firm to have more efficient technology than the private firm,
though the welfare-maximizing public firm behaves aggressively.
Finally, on the basis of analyses described above, we looked into the relationship between
trade liberalization and world welfare. With linear demand, or the horizontal reaction curve of
the public firm, we found that a small tariff reduction contributes to an improvement in world
welfare. Both an increase in private firm’s profits and removal of overproduction by the public
firm account for this result. Moreover, complete trade liberalization can be concluded if additional
assumptions; (i) the public firm’s marginal cost is linearly decreasing in installation and (ii) R&D
cost function is quadratic.
We finish this paper by make two remarks on the future researches. One is related to the
competition and markets we considered. We ignored the presence of domestic private firms. As
pointed out by Nishimori and Ogawa (2002), if domestic private firms are taken into account,
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the public firm attempts to decrease its R&D investment level to replace its production with pro-
duction by more efficient private firms. This illustrates that in order to compensate a decrease in
domestic private firms’ outputs due to a tariff reduction, the public firm could lower its invest-
ment. In other words, it is possible that the optimal R&D level is increasing in tariffs. Such a
possibility should be explored in detail. The other remark is relevant to a world wide wave of
liberalization and deregulation. All over the world, many public firms have been privatized cor-
responding to such a wave. In this paper, unfortunately, we did not investigate privatization of
public firms. The literature on mixed oligopoly have explored correlation among priavatization
and other policies such as industrial policies, strategic trade policies, and so on. In line with these
streams, we should attempt to unlock the effect of privatization in international mixed oligopoly
with public firms’ R&D policy.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The third-stage equilibrium is defined as q∗0(x0, t) = R0(q∗1(x0, t), x0) and q∗1(x0, t) = R1(q∗0(x0, t), t).
Differetiating them with respect to x0,

1 −∂R0
∂q1
−∂R1
∂q0
1


∂q∗0
∂x0
∂q∗1
∂x0
 =

∂R0
∂x0
0
 .
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Solving the equation system, we obtain ∂q∗i /∂x0 = ∆xi /∆ (i = 0, 1), where
∆ := 1 − ∂R0
∂q1
· ∂R1
∂q0
=
2
[2 + εθ∗(x0, t)] [1 − εθ∗(x0, t)] > 0,
∆x0 :=
∂R0
∂x0
=
C′(x0)
[1 − εθ∗(x0, t)] P′(Q∗(x0, t)) > 0,
∆x1 :=
∂R1
∂q0
· ∂R0
∂x0
= − [1 + εθ
∗(x0, t)] C′(x0)
[1 − εθ∗(x0, t)] [2 + εθ∗(x0, t)] P′(Q∗(x0, t)) < 0.
Thus, one of the desired results is acquired. Through the same procedure, we find that ∂q∗i /∂t =
∆ti/∆ (i = 0, 1), where
∆t0 :=
∂R0
∂q1
· ∂R1
∂t
=
εθ∗(x0, t)
[2 + εθ∗(x0, t)] [1 − εθ∗(x0, t)] P′(Q∗(x0, t)) ,
∆t1 :=
∂R1
∂t
=
1
[2 + εθ∗(x0, t)] P′(Q∗(x0, t)) < 0.
Therefore, all the results are proved. 
Proof of Lemma 2
First, we prove (i) by evaluating Eq.(2) at x = xd0(t). Noticing that ∂F(xd0(t), t)/∂x0 = C′(xd0(t))q∗0(xd0(t), t)+
C(xd0(t))(∂q∗0/∂x0) + f ′(xd0(t)) = 0, we have
∂W∗
∂x0
∣∣∣∣∣
x0=xd0(t)
= P(Q∗(xd0(t), t))
∂q∗1
∂x0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x0=xd0(t)
+ C(xd0(t))
∂q∗0
∂x0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x0=xd0(t)
,
(from definition of xd0(t) and Eq.(1))
= − C
′(xd0(t))
2P′(Q∗(xd0(t), t))
{
−P(Q∗(xd0(t), t)) +
[
2 + εθ∗(xd0(t), t)
]
P′(Q∗(xd0(t), t))q∗1(xd0(t), t)
}
,
(from Lemma 1 and Eq.(2))
> 0.
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Thus, by the second-order condition, we obtain xd0(t) < x∗0(t). Next, we proceed to the proof of (ii).
Note that in public monopoly, the public firm selects xm0 and qm0 which satisfy P(qm0 ) − C(xm0 ) = 0
and C′(xm0 )qm0 + f ′(xm0 ) = 0. Similar to the proof of (i), we evaluate Eq.(2) at x = xm. Abbreviating
augment xm0 for saving pages, we have
∂W∗
∂x0
∣∣∣∣∣
x0=xm0
=
[
t − P′(Q∗)q∗1
] ∂q∗1
∂x0
−C′(xm0 )q∗0 + C′(xm0 )qm0 ,
(from the definition of xm0 )
= t · ∂q
∗
1
∂x0
+ C′(xm0 )
[(
1 + εθ∗
2
)
q∗1 + q
m
0 − q∗0
]
, (7)
(from Lemma 1).
Noting that R0(0, xm0 ) = qm0 and sgn (∂R0/∂q1) = sgn(ε), we find that qm0 R q∗0(xm0 , t) if and only
if ε Q 0. Then, suppose that ε ≤ 0. In this case, Eq.(7) is negative and thus, xm0 > x∗0(t). Next,
suppose that ε > 0. The presumption stated in Lemma 2, Eq.(3), ensures that Eq.(7) is positive.
Therefore we obtain xm0 > x∗0(t). 
Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1. We start from deriving the second-order derivatives of R0 and R1. Differentiating the
first-order condition for the private firm with respect to q0 and arranging the equation leads to
P′(q0 + R1(q0, t))
[
1 + 2
∂R1
∂q0
+
(
1 +
∂R1
∂q0
)
εˆθ
]
= 0,
where ˆθ = R1(q0, t)/(q0 + R1(q0, t)). Differentiate both sides of this equation with respect to q0
once again, we find that
(2 + εˆθ)∂
2R1
∂q20
+
ε
q0 + R1(q0, t)
(
1 +
∂R1
∂q0
) [
∂R1
∂q0
−
(
1 +
∂R1
∂q0
)
ˆθ
]
= 0,
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where use is made of the envelope theorem. Thus, it follows that
∂2R0
∂q20
= −
ε
Q
(
1 +
∂R1
∂q0
) [
∂R1
∂q0
−
(
1 +
∂R1
∂q0
)
ˆθ
]
2 + εˆθ
,
= −
ε
2 + εˆθ
[
−1 + εˆθ
2 + εˆθ
− ˆθ
2 + εˆθ
]
Q(2 + εˆθ) , (from Proof of Lemma 1),
=
ε
[
1 + ˆθ(1 + ε)
]
Q(2 + εˆθ)3 .
Analogously, the cross second-order derivative of R1 can be derived as follows:
∂2R1
∂t∂q0
= − ε(1 − ˆθ)QP′(Q)(2 + εˆθ)3 .
Next, we proceed to derivation of the second-order derivatives of R0. To this end, differentiating
the first order condition with respect to q1 and rearranging it result in
P′(R0(q1, x0) + q1)
[
∂R0
∂q1
− ε˜θ
(
1 +
∂R0
∂q1
)]
= 0.
where ˜θ := q1/(R0(q1, x0) + q1). By differentiating this equation with respect to q1 and x0, we find
that
∂2R0
∂q21
=
ε
[
1 − ˜θ(1 + ε)
]
Q(1 − ε˜θ)3 ,
∂2R0
∂x0∂q1
= − ε˜θC
′(x0)
QP′(Q)(1 − ε˜θ)3 .
Step 2. We calculate ∂2q∗i /∂t∂x0 (i = 0, 1). From differentiating the second-stage equilibrium
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conditions with respect to x0 and then to t,

1 −∂R0
∂q1
−∂R1
∂q0
1


∂2q∗0
∂t∂x0
∂2q∗1
∂t∂x0
 =

A1
A2
 ,
where
A1 =
∂q∗1
∂t
(
∂q∗1
∂x0
· ∂
2R0
∂q21
+
∂2R0
∂q1∂x0
)
= −
ε(1 − εθ∗)
[
−1 + 3θ∗ + ε(1 + ε)θ∗2
]
C′(x0)
4P′(Q∗)2Q∗(1 − εθ∗)3 ,
A2 =
∂q∗0
∂x0
(
∂q∗0
∂t
· ∂
2R1
∂q20
+
∂2R1
∂t∂q0
)
=
ε(−1 + θ∗ + εθ∗)C′(x0)
4P′(Q∗)(2 + εθ∗) .
Therefore, we get ∂2q∗i /∂t∂x0 = ∆txi /∆ (i = 0, 1), where
∆tx0 := A1 +
∂R0
∂q1
A2 = −
ε
[
−1 + 3θ∗ + 2εθ∗2 + ε2(1 + ε)θ∗3
]
C′(x0)
2Q∗P′(Q∗)(2 + εθ∗)(1 − εθ∗)2 ,
∆tx1 := A2 +
∂R1
∂q0
A1 =
ε
[
−1 + (2 + ε)θ∗ + (1 − ε)εθ∗2 + ε2(1 + ε)θ∗3
]
2Q∗P′(Q∗)(2 + εθ∗)(1 − εθ∗)2 .
Step 3. By virtue of the first-order condition in the first-stage, applying the implicit function
theorem, we obtain
x∗′(t) = −∂
2W∗(x∗0(t), t)/∂t∂x0
∂2W∗(x∗0(t), t)/∂x20
.
Coupled with the second-order condition, this implies that sgn(x∗′(t)) = sgn(∂2W∗(x∗0(t), t)/∂t∂x0).
Simple calculation reveals that ∂2W∗/∂t∂x0 is decomposed into three parts as follows:
∂2W∗
∂t∂x0
=
[
1 − P′(Q∗)∂q
∗
1
∂t
− q∗1P′′(Q∗)
∂Q∗
∂t
]
∂q∗1
∂x0
+
[
t − P′(Q∗)q∗1
] ∂2q∗1
∂t∂x0
−C′(x0)
∂q∗0
∂t
. (8)
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Invoking Lemma 1, the first term in the right-hand side can be reduced to
[
1 − P′(Q∗)∂q
∗
1
∂t
− q∗1P′′(Q∗)
∂Q∗
∂t
]
∂q∗1
∂x0
=
1
2
· ∂q
∗
1
∂x0
.
Suppose that ∂2q∗1/∂t∂x0 < 0. Then, Eq.(8) is rewritten by
∂2W∗
∂t∂x0
=
1
2
· ∂q
∗
1
∂x0
+
[
t − P′(Q∗)q∗1
] ∂2q∗1
∂t∂x0
−C′(x0)
∂q∗0
∂t
,
=
[
t − P′(Q∗)q∗1
] ∂2q∗1
∂t∂x0
+
1
2
[(1 + εθ∗)C′(x0)
2P′(Q∗)
]
− εθ
∗C′(x0)
2P′(Q∗) ,
=
[
t − P′(Q∗)q∗1
] ∂2q∗1
∂t∂x0
− (1 + 3εθ
∗)C′(x0)
4P′(Q∗) .
Therefore, we have x∗′(t) < 0 for ε ∈ [− 13 , 1]. Next, on the contrary, suppose that ∂2q∗1/∂t∂x0 ≥ 0.
By virtue of Eq.(2) and Lemma 1, Eq.(8) evaluated at x0 = x∗0(t) can be rearranged as follows.
∂2W∗(x∗0(t), t)
∂t∂x0
=
1
2
· ∂q
∗
1
∂x0
−C′(x∗0)
∂q∗0
∂t
+
C′(x∗0)q∗0 + f ′(x∗0)
∂q∗1/∂x0
· ∂
2q∗1
∂t∂x0
,
= −(1 + εθ
∗)C′(x∗0)
4P′(Q∗) −
(1 − εθ∗)C′(x∗0)
2P′(Q∗) −
2P′(Q∗)
(1 + εθ∗)C′(x∗0)
· ∂
2q∗1
∂t∂x0
[
C′(x∗0)q∗0 + f ′(x∗0)
]
.
Furthermore, invoking the result of Step 2 (∂2q∗1/∂t∂x0 = ∆tx1 /∆), this can be rewritten by
∂2W∗(x∗0(t), t)
∂t∂x0
= − C
′(x0)B
4P′(Q∗)(1 + εθ∗)(1 − εθ∗) −
2P′(Q∗) f ′(x∗0)
(1 + εθ∗)C′(x∗0)
· ∂
2q∗1
∂t∂x0
, (9)
where
B = (1 + εθ∗)(1 − εθ∗)(3 − εθ∗) + 2(1 − θ∗)ε
[
−1 + (2 + ε)θ∗ + (1 − ε)εθ∗2 + ε2(1 + ε)θ∗3
]
,
> (1 − θ∗)(3 − εθ∗ − 2ε) + 2(1 − θ∗)ε
[
(2 + ε)θ∗ + (1 − ε)εθ∗2 + ε2(1 + ε)θ∗3
]
,
= (1 − θ∗)
[
3 − 2ε(1 − θ∗) + 2ε4θ∗ + 2ε2θ∗(1 + θ∗) − 2ε3θ∗2(1 − θ∗2)
]
,
> 0.
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Since both the first and second terms in the right-hand side of Eq.(9) are negative, it follows that
x∗′(t) < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Solving Eq.(4) with respect to t∗(x0), we have
t∗(x0) = P′(Q∗(x0, t∗(x0))) −
q∗1(x0, t∗(x0))
∂q∗1/∂t
,
= − (1 + εθ
∗(x0, t∗(x0)))q∗1(x0, t∗(x0))P′(Q∗(x0, t∗(x0)))
1 − εθ∗(x0, t∗(x0)) , (from Lemma 1),
> 0.
Thus, we obtained the desired result. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider Eqs.(2) and (4) evaluated at xe0 and te. By multiplying both sides of Eq.(4) by C′(xe0) and
subtracting the multiplied equation from Eq.(2), it follows that
[
te − P′(Q∗(xe0, te))q∗1(xe0, te)
] [∂q∗1
∂x0
− ∂q
∗
1
∂t
C′(xe0)
]
−C′(xe0)Q∗(xe0, te) − f ′(xe0) = 0.
Moreover, this can be simplified as
Q∗(xe0, te) = −
te − P′(Q∗(xe0, te))q∗1(xe0, te)
P′(Q∗(xe0, te))
− f
′(xe0)
C′(xe0)
.
where use is made of Lemma 1. In addition, using Eq.(4) again, we have
q∗1(xe0, te) = −
[
t − P′(Q∗(xe0, te))q∗1(xe0, te)
] ∂q∗1
∂t
= −
[
1 − εθ∗(xe0, te)
] [
t − P′(Q∗(xe0, te))q∗1(xe0, te)
]
2P′(Q∗(xe0, te))
.
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These equations show that
q∗1(xe0, te)
Q∗(xe0, te)
=
[
1 − εθ∗(xe0, te)
] [
t − P′(Q∗(xe0, te))q∗1(xe0, te)
]
2P′(Q∗(xe0, te))
te − P′(Q∗(xe0, te))q∗1(xe0, te)
P′(Q∗(xe0, te))
+
f ′(xe0)
C′(xe0)
,
=
1 − εθ∗(xe0, te)
2
1 + P
′(Q∗(xe0, te)) f ′(xe0)
C′(xe0)
[
t − P′(Q∗(xe0, te))q∗1(xe0, te)
]

,
<
1
2
(if ε ≥ 0).
This directly purports that q∗0(xe0, te) > q∗1(xe0, te). 
Proof of Lemma 3
Evaluating Eq.(5) at x∗0(t),
∂W∗T (x∗0(t), t)
∂x0
= P′(Q∗(x∗0(t), t))q∗1(x∗0(t), t) ·
∂q∗0
∂x0
< 0.
From the second-order condition for optimization of W∗T with respect to x0, it is concluded that
x∗0(t) > x∗∗0 (t). 
Proof of Proposition 4
To prove this proposition, let us arrange Ŵ ′T (te).
Ŵ ′T (te) =
∂Π1
∂q0
· ∂q
∗
0
∂x0
· x∗′0 (te) +
∂Π1
∂q0
· ∂q
∗
0
∂t
+
∂Π
∂t
,
= P′(Q∗)q∗1 ·
2C′(x∗0(te))
2P′(Q∗) · x
∗′(te) − q∗1, (from Lemma 1 and ε = 0),
= − q
∗
1
∂2W∗/∂x20
[
C′(x∗0(te)) ·
∂2W∗
∂t∂x0
+
∂2W∗
∂x20
]
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Complicated computation leads to the quantity in the brackets as follows:
C′(x∗0(te))
(
∂q∗1
∂x0
− ∂q
∗
0
∂x0
)
−C′′(x∗0(te))q∗0 − f ′′(x∗0(te))
= −3C
′(x∗0(te))2
2P′(Q∗) −C
′′(x∗0(te))q∗0 − f ′′(x∗0(te))
The second-order condition of optimization for world welfare, with ε = 0, is given by
∂2W∗T
∂x20
=
∂2W∗
∂x20
+
∂2Π∗1
∂x20
,
=
[
C′(x0)
2
· ∂q
∗
1
∂x0
−C′′(x0)q∗0 −C′(x0) ·
∂q∗0
∂x0
− f ′′(x0)
]
+
[
C′′(x0)q∗1 + C′(x0) ·
∂q∗1
∂x0
]
,
= −7C
′(x0)2
4P′(Q∗) + C
′′(x0)q∗1 −C′′(x0)q∗0 − f ′′(x0),
< 0.
Since this condition must hold for all x0 ≥ 0 as long as interior solutions exist, we find that
0 >
∂2W∗(x∗0(te), te)
∂x20
= −7C
′(x∗0(te))2
4P′(Q∗) + C
′′(x∗0(te))q∗1 −C′′(x∗0(te))q∗0 − f ′′(x∗0(te)),
> −7C
′(x0)2
4P′(Q∗) −C
′′(x0)q∗0 − f ′′(x0), (from Assumption 2),
> −3C
′(x∗0(te))2
2P′(Q∗) −C
′′(x∗0(te))q∗0 − f ′′(x∗0(te)), (from Assumption 1).
Thus, it follows that Ŵ ′T (te) < 0. 
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